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American Sociological Review 2013 78: 315

DOI: 10.1177/0003122412473107

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American Sociological Review
78(2) 315–332
© American Sociological
Association 2013
DOI: 10.1177/0003122412473107
<http://asr.sagepub.com>



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Abstract

Previous research has found that in recent years immigrants had a higher propensity to unionize than did native-born workers. However, little research shows that historically marginalized immigrant workers are able to maintain newly acquired union jobs, especially during times unfavorable to unionization more generally. This comment focuses on immigrant unionization during the Great Recession of 2008 to determine whether inroads that immigrants made through organizing were maintained in hostile union environments. Using the Current Population Survey (CPS), I extend Rosenfeld and Kleykamp's (2009) models for Hispanic unionization (which end in 2007) through the recent downturn and beyond. I find that Hispanic immigrants, who held higher odds of union entry or membership in Rosenfeld and Kleykamp's pre-recession analysis, lost union jobs at an increased rate during the Great Recession compared with native-born white workers. These effects for Hispanic immigrants filtered throughout various subcategories and control variables, including years since entry, citizenship status, and nationality. These results are likely not due to immigrants' unfavorable labor market allocation, and to some degree undercut the hopes of those who view immigrants as the key to organized labor's future and organized labor as the key to immigrant prosperity.

Keywords

economy, immigrants, Great Recession, unions

After decades of de-unionization, research suggests that Hispanics—and Hispanic immigrants in particular—may revitalize organized labor in the United States. Most of this research consists of case studies of individual organizing campaigns (see, e.g., Milkman 2006). In 2009, however, Rosenfeld and Kleykamp (hereafter RK) set out to determine whether these campaigns had produced quantifiable gains at the national level. By analyzing detailed data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), they found that when compared to native-born whites “many Hispanic subgroups are no less likely,” and some Hispanic subgroups are “more likely,” to join or belong to labor unions (Rosenfeld and Kleykamp 2009:933). These results are important, for

they buttress the hopes of both Hispanic workers, who view union membership as a potential avenue to upward mobility, and union organizers, who view immigrants as a potential source of new members. RK note that overall union density is low in the United States, and that unionization is therefore unlikely to usher in widespread assimilation absent a “fundamental restructuring of the institutional underpinnings of organized

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labor” (p. 933), but they find that Hispanic immigrants “organize at higher rates than do U.S. born whites” (p. 932) and interpret their findings as evidence for the “steady” assimilation of Hispanics who find themselves in “organizable labor market positions” (p. 933).

But the CPS did not begin to identify immigrants until 1994. RK conducted their analyses in the years prior to the Great Recession of 2007 to 2009. The bulk of their data are therefore drawn from a decidedly prosperous period in U.S. history. Will the immigrant influx survive the recent downturn? While RK “indirectly control” (p. 919) for effects of the business cycle by deploying state and year fixed effects, they neither test—nor claim to test—effects of the macroeconomy more generally. Their conclusions are therefore vulnerable to charges of ahistoricism that bedevil analysts who try to control—rather than theorize—effects of time (Isaac and Griffin 1989).

I therefore address the effects of the recent downturn head-on by extending the models developed by RK through the Great Recession of 2008 and beyond. Results suggest that Hispanic immigrants, who held higher odds of union entry or membership in RK’s pre-recession analysis, lost union jobs more rapidly than did native non-Hispanic whites during the downturn regardless of citizenship and years since entry. In all likelihood, these results are not attributable to the unfavorable labor market allocation of immigrants, as will be discussed below, and to some degree undercut the hopes of both those who view immigrants as the key to organized labor’s future and those who view unionization as the key to immigrant prosperity.¹

DATA AND METHODS

Data come from the CPS-March outgoing rotation groups and Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (MORG) for various years.² I recoded labor market position and firm size variables to match RK’s do files, and data are limited to non-self-employed wage and salary workers age 18 to 65 years.³ First, using a logistic regression to determine the odds of union

membership, I analyze cross-sections from the 2007 and 2009 CPS-March outgoing rotation groups. The first analysis predicts the odds of union membership in 2007 (the last year of RK’s data) and the second analysis predicts the odds of union membership in 2009 (near the bottom of the recession). I examine differences between the two years for race/ethnicity categories as well as Hispanic immigrant racial/ethnic subcategories.

A second analysis takes advantage of the longitudinal aspect of the CPS. Using the same matching scheme for the MORG provided by RK, I report the odds that members of immigrant racial/ethnic groups will leave a union from one year to the next. The matching process creates two-year panel data from which changes in union status can be calculated. I performed a multinomial logistic regression with four unordered categorical outcomes (i.e., joining a union, leaving a union, staying in a union, and never being in a union). I ran multinomial regressions for the years 2004 to 2006 (boom years), 2006 to 2008 (an intermediary period), and 2008 to 2010 (the recession and post-recession).⁴

RESULTS

Modeling Union Membership through the Recession

Table 1 presents the odds of union membership in 2007 and 2009 following RK’s market position and firm size models.⁵ The 2007 cross-section replicates the last year of their study and supports their analysis (see Rosenfeld and Kleykamp 2009: Table 2, p. 926).⁶ In 2007, Hispanics were neither more nor less likely to hold a union job than were non-Hispanic whites, following RK, in both the market position and firm size models. In 2009, however, while failing to reach conventional significance levels, Hispanics had 22.4 percent lower odds of holding union jobs than did their non-Hispanic white counterparts in the market position model. Once firm size is included, Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites continue to show no statistically discernible differences in

Table 1. Odds Ratios from Logistic Regressions Predicting Unionization; 18- to 65-Year-Old Wage and Salary Workers, 2007 and 2009

	2007		2009	
	Market Position	Firm Size	Market Position	Firm Size
Race (White ref.)				
Black	1.303* (2.18)	1.262 (1.91)	1.159 (1.22)	1.090 (.71)
Hispanic	1.059 (.50)	1.081 (.66)	.776 (-1.94)	.807 (-1.60)
Other race	.727 (-1.90)	.723 (-1.90)	.994 (-.05)	.980 (-.14)
Male	1.242* (2.84)	1.235* (2.74)	1.152 (1.82)	1.143 (1.70)
Married	1.094 (1.21)	1.109 (1.36)	1.140 (1.74)	1.150 (1.84)
Age (exper.)	1.041* (2.92)	1.037* (2.56)	1.068* (4.57)	1.063* (4.20)
Age sq. (exper. squared)	.999 (-1.88)	.999 (-1.65)	.999* (-3.68)	.999* (-3.37)
Education (<HS ref.)				
High school	1.541* (2.89)	1.379* (2.09)	1.294 (1.50)	1.154 (.83)
Some college	1.460* (2.34)	1.264 (1.42)	1.593* (2.58)	1.366 (1.71)
BA +	1.593* (2.92)	1.325 (1.71)	1.654* (2.84)	1.383 (1.80)
Private Sector	.118* (-22.38)	.153* (-18.97)	.110* (-23.27)	.140* (-19.95)
Occupation (professional/managerial reference)				
Farm/forestry/fishery	1.072 (.08)	1.529 (.52)	.099* (-2.08)	.130 (-1.83)
Production/craft/repair	2.634* (8.20)	2.812* (8.66)	2.676* (8.49)	2.864* (8.86)
Service occupations	1.149 (1.51)	1.200 (1.93)	1.036 (.40)	1.098 (1.04)
Industry (Ag. ref.)				
Mining	2.653 (1.50)	2.233 (1.20)	5.089* (2.17)	3.888 (1.75)
Construction	2.428 (1.72)	3.113* (2.03)	4.991* (2.39)	5.811* (2.54)
Manu. durables	2.217 (1.54)	1.728 (.98)	3.380 (1.81)	2.598 (1.38)
Manu. nondurables	3.412* (2.36)	2.517 (1.66)	5.239* (2.45)	4.027* (2.00)
Transportation	5.181* (3.16)	4.127* (2.54)	10.883* (3.55)	8.904* (3.16)
Communications	4.248* (2.66)	2.898 (1.82)	6.867* (2.77)	4.863* (2.22)
Utilities	3.271* (2.07)	2.471 (1.50)	6.517* (2.64)	4.875* (2.18)
Wholesale trade	1.222 (.34)	1.051 (.08)	1.673 (.71)	1.479 (.53)
Retail trade	1.461 (.73)	1.207 (.34)	1.719 (.80)	1.404 (.49)

Table 1. (continued)

	2007		2009	
	Market Position	Firm Size	Market Position	Firm Size
F.I.R.E.	.483 (-1.23)	.375 (-1.57)	1.333 (.41)	1.063 (.09)
Business repair	.910 (-.17)	.839 (-.30)	.777 (-.35)	.767 (-.36)
Personal services	1.575 (.81)	1.671 (.85)	1.704 (.75)	1.727 (.75)
Rec./entertain.	1.648 (.84)	1.510 (.65)	4.187* (1.97)	3.516 (1.69)
Professional services	2.649 (1.91)	2.314 (1.53)	4.211* (2.17)	3.740 (1.93)
Public admin.	1.709 (1.03)	1.504 (.73)	3.568 (1.89)	3.160 (1.67)
Unclassified	.603 (-.64)	.526 (-.76)	4.238 (1.78)	3.341 (1.43)
Firm Size (<25 ref.)				
25 to 99		1.829* (3.81)		1.536* (2.84)
100 to 499		3.417* (8.42)		2.851* (7.60)
500 to 999		4.415* (8.57)		3.700* (8.09)
1,000+		4.553* (11.24)		3.584* (10.21)
State/Metro Effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	13,692	13,692	13,082	13,082
McFadden's R ²	.2258	.2513	.2649	.2840
BIC	8,870	8,680	8,501	8,336

Note: z-statistics are in parentheses. Data come from the CPS-March outgoing rotation group for appropriate year. Models weighted with the appropriate CPS weights. BICs calculated without weights. Rosenfeld and Kleykamp (2009) do not use full-time in their model citing that "many unions push to convert part-time positions to full-time during contract negotiations" (p. 935). However, they do use a full-time indicator as a robustness check and find "substantively similar results" (p. 935). I confirm their finding. Rosenfeld and Kleykamp (2009) also control for public administration (labeled government in their tables) and private sector, variables that should be inversely related. The correlation between these two variables in 2007 and 2009 is $-.54$ (rounded to the nearest hundredth). According to the Census Bureau, individuals who remain in the public administration industry "oversee governmental programs and activities that are not performed by private establishments" (<http://www.census.gov/naics>). The Census Bureau further specifies, "government establishments engaged in the production of private-sector-like goods and services should be classified in the same industry as private-sector establishments engaged in similar activities" (<http://www.census.gov/naics>). Therefore, all individuals in the public administration industry remain in the public sector, but those in other industries may be in either the private or public sector. As a robustness check, first, I ran all models without the private sector dummy. I found substantively similar results for the race/ethnic groups, but the model fit is greatly reduced. A second robustness check collapsed the industry variables into major industry codes defined by Waldinger and Der-Martirosian (2000). One dummy includes all public sector/public administration workers and five other private industry sectors. Again, I found substantively similar results for the race/ethnic categories, however, the other race category flirts with different levels of significance. F.I.R.E. refers to financial, insurance, and real estate industries.

* $p < .05$ (two-tailed tests).

the likelihood of holding a union job. Hispanic ethnicity, however, includes immigrants and nonimmigrants and obscures heterogeneous origins among both groups.

Table 2 presents odds ratios for immigrant subcategories in the 2007 and 2009 cross-sections. The first set of models includes immigrant and nonimmigrant race/ethnic categories with controls identical to Table 1. RK do not report equivalent findings; therefore, a comparison to their models is impossible. Nonetheless, I find that in 2007, *ceteris paribus*, Hispanic immigrants revealed no statistically discernible disadvantage vis-a-vis non-Hispanic whites in terms of union membership. In 2009, however, Hispanic immigrants had 46.7 percent lower odds of union membership in the market position model and 41.4 percent lower odds once firm size variables are added. Given that these effects do not filter through all immigrant race/ethnic categories, they suggest that mechanisms that predict a lower propensity for Hispanic immigrants to organize are in place, whatever those mechanisms may be.

The second set of models in Table 2 includes years since entry for Hispanic immigrants. RK found that, controlling for relevant variables, Hispanic immigrants who had lived in the United States for more than 20 years were no more likely to hold union jobs than were native-born whites. But they also noted that immigrant organizing is a relatively recent phenomenon and their data may therefore have averaged out its effects. This interpretation finds some support in my analyses, which show that Hispanic immigrants with more than 20 years in the United States had over 70 percent higher odds of unionization than did native non-Hispanic whites in 2007. But the two groups betrayed no statistically discernible differences in 2009, when the odds ratio for experienced Hispanics actually fell below 1. Moreover, recent Hispanic immigrants had lower odds of unionization than did non-Hispanic whites in both 2007 and 2009. Finally, the gap between newcomers and non-Hispanic whites was larger at the bottom of the recession.

The third set of models in Table 2 addresses the subcategory of Hispanic immigrant citizenship status. Hispanic immigrant citizens had over 60 percent higher odds of unionization than did their native white counterparts in 2007. This effect is different from that found by RK, who show that, controlling for firm size, these citizens had 20 percent higher odds of unionization than did non-Hispanic whites. I found that in 2007, Hispanic immigrant noncitizens revealed no difference in the odds of holding a union job when compared to native-born whites. This also differs from RK's results, which show that Hispanic immigrant noncitizens had 40 percent lower odds of holding a union job, all else being equal. As in previous models, differences between my 2007 cross-section and RK's analysis may be due to their larger sample, because their data are spread over several years that may average out the statistical effect of one year. Differences between 2007 and 2009 show similar patterns: the statistically significant advantage Hispanic immigrant citizens enjoyed in 2007 fell to nonsignificance in 2009; and Hispanic immigrant noncitizens had over 50 percent lower odds of unionization than did native non-Hispanic whites (from no statistically discernible effect in 2007). Hispanic immigrants who became citizens, and in so doing underwent some form of assimilation, were still disadvantaged in holding onto union jobs.

The last set of models in Table 2 includes Hispanic nationality and immigrant subcategories. Unionists or employers may view immigrants differently depending on their country of origin. Furthermore, differential socialization at the point of origin may influence the propensity to unionize in the United States. In RK's analysis, Mexican immigrants and non-Mexican Hispanic immigrants had lower odds of unionization than did native non-Hispanic whites. Although my 2007 analysis reveals no significant difference in their propensity to organize, by 2009 Mexican and non-Mexican Hispanic immigrants had lower odds of union membership than did native-born whites net of other factors.

Table 2. Immigrant Subcategories; Odds Ratios from Logistic Regressions Predicting Unionization; 18- to 65-Year-Old Wage and Salary Earners, 2007 and 2009

	2007		2009	
	Market Position	Firm Size	Market Position	Firm Size
Immigrant Race				
White immigrant	.709 (-1.54)	.749 (-1.34)	.975 (-.12)	.956 (-.21)
Black nonimmigrant	1.392* (2.60)	1.356* (2.38)	1.141 (1.02)	1.077 (.57)
Black immigrant	.715 (-.91)	.679 (-1.06)	1.239 (.72)	1.141 (.46)
Hispanic nonimmigrant	1.077 (.48)	1.077 (.46)	1.015 (.09)	1.005 (.03)
Hispanic immigrant	.989 (-.07)	1.039 (.25)	.533* (-3.28)	.586* (-2.71)
Other nonimmigrant	.851 (-.68)	.817 (-.82)	1.232 (1.08)	1.194 (.89)
Other immigrant	.627* (-2.15)	.640* (-2.03)	.828 (-1.01)	.828 (-.99)
N	13,692	13,692	13,082	13,082
McFadden's R^2	.2269	.2523	.2664	.2850
BIC	8,901	8,711	8,529	8,367
Years Entry				
Hispanic nonimmigrant	1.073 (.46)	1.072 (.43)	1.015 (.10)	1.006 (.04)
Hispanic immigrated 20+ years	1.702* (2.60)	1.762* (2.79)	.637 (-1.58)	.663 (-1.41)
Hispanic immigrated 10 to 20 years	.963 (-.15)	1.046 (.17)	.673 (-1.45)	.741 (-1.05)
Hispanic immigrated 5 to 10 years	.514* (-2.14)	.516* (-2.07)	.310* (-2.57)	.362* (-2.21)
Hispanic immigrated fewer than five years	.393 (-1.96)	.438 (-1.59)	.169* (-2.30)	.222* (-2.00)
N	13,692	13,692	13,082	13,082
McFadden's R^2	.2292	.2544	.2672	.2856
BIC	8,911	8,724	8,551	8,390
Citizenship				
Hispanic nonimmigrant	1.071 (.45)	1.072 (.43)	1.012 (.08)	1.002 (.02)
Hispanic immigrant citizen	1.639* (2.28)	1.685* (2.43)	.725 (-1.19)	.743 (-1.05)
Hispanic immigrant noncitizen	.745 (-1.60)	.791 (-1.24)	.413* (-3.60)	.479* (-2.96)
N	13,692	13,692	13,082	13,082
McFadden's R^2	.2281	.2533	.2668	.2854
BIC	8,905	8,716	8,535	8,374
Nationality				
Hispanic nonimmigrant, non-Mexican	1.143 (.59)	1.142 (.54)	1.359 (1.43)	1.366 (1.43)
Hispanic immigrant, non-Mexican	1.106 (.50)	1.172 (.77)	.478* (-2.58)	.525* (-2.22)
Mexican nonimmigrant	1.027 (.14)	1.028 (.14)	.830 (-.93)	.814 (-1.00)
Mexican immigrant	.901 (-.55)	.940 (-.32)	.567* (-2.47)	.623* (-1.99)
N	13,692	13,692	13,082	13,082
McFadden's R^2	.2270	.2524	.2669	.2855
BIC	8,919	8,730	8,542	8,379

Note: z-statistics are in parentheses. Data come from the CPS-March outgoing rotation group for appropriate year. All models include variables from Table 1. The reference category for all models is nonimmigrant whites. Models weighted with the appropriate CPS weights, BICs calculated without weights.

* $p < .05$ (two-tailed tests). Downloaded from asr.sagepub.com at ASA - American Sociological Association on March 29, 2013

Furthermore, the gap between these two groups and non-Hispanic whites in 2009 was greater than that found in RK's pre-recession analysis. By contrast, Hispanic-origin and Mexican-origin natives showed no difference in union membership compared to native non-Hispanic whites in both years.

Table 3 reports interactions for year and immigrant subcategories pooling 2007, 2008, and 2009. For the results discussed earlier, the 2009 interaction coefficients show that observed differences are correctly signed in all—and statistically significant in most—cases. These results suggest mechanisms are in play that pushed Hispanic immigrants to leave union jobs at higher rates than did native non-Hispanic whites and native-born Hispanics during the Great Recession. However, it is important to understand whether these effects are specific to the Great Recession, or whether Hispanic immigrants' de-unionization is a function of broader economic circumstances over time. I therefore leverage the full dataset for which immigrant status is available (1994 to 2011).⁷ I present the interaction of the co-racial/ethnic unemployment rate for respondents age 18 to 65 years and the immigrant subcategories.⁸ Because unions emphasize economic gains for their members, there may be a disemployment effect where higher wages force employers to lower the number of employees in a firm. Workers, then, may become unemployed until they find employment in the nonunion sector. To prevent this potential reverse causality, I lag the unemployment rate by one year (e.g., last year's co-racial/ethnic unemployment rate predicts this year's co-racial/ethnic unionization odds). Table 4 presents interactions for 1994 to 2007 (just before the Great Recession) and then adds the recession years.

In the years prior to the Great Recession, Table 4 shows no interaction effect unique to immigrants vis-à-vis native non-Hispanic whites. We might find effects between unemployment and Hispanic immigrants if we could examine years prior to 1994 (when the CPS began to track immigrant status), because unemployment did not increase sharply in the

years leading up to the Great Recession.⁹ However, with inclusion of the Great Recession years, 2008 to 2011, unemployment produces lower odds of unionization for Hispanic immigrants compared with native non-Hispanic whites. The interaction effect filters through Hispanic immigrant noncitizens and Hispanic- and Mexican-origin immigrants. Interestingly, the years since entry model suggests that only immigrants who have remained in the United States for a long time and recent arrivals have lower unionization odds as unemployment increases (although recent arrivals fail to reach a conventional significance level in the firm size model). Recessions might have a nonlinear interaction with time since arrival, where low and long tenure predicts de-unionization as unemployment increases. Low tenure immigrants may have been subject to last hired, first fired dynamics, and long tenured immigrants may have voluntarily taken early retirement in the downturn or involuntarily lost their union jobs and found it difficult to retrain. Nevertheless, these mechanisms are purely speculative and should be examined in future research.

Hispanic immigrants who became citizens, however, show no statistically discernible difference from native non-Hispanic whites, which may support the notion of assimilation into the economic mainstream. Inclusion of the Great Recession years supports the earlier analysis and suggests that Hispanic immigrants are more likely to lose union jobs (voluntarily or involuntarily) at an increased rate as unemployment rates skyrocket. These effects may be due to the recession affecting unionized sectors more than nonunionized sectors, unfavorable labor market allocation, seniority schemes, or a host of other mechanisms. The following analysis sheds light on potential reasons for the decrease in odds of unionization for immigrants.

Modeling the Odds of Leaving a Union

The CPS-Matched MORG dataset allows one to estimate the shift from employment to

Table 3. Odds Ratios of Interactions between Year and Race/Ethnic Subcategories from Pooled Data 2007 to 2009

	Labor Market Position	Firm Size
Immigrant Race		
White immigrant 2008	.847 (-.53)	.852 (-.51)
White immigrant 2009	1.423 (1.16)	1.343 (.98)
African American 2008	.753 (-1.68)	.742 (-1.76)
African American 2009	.834 (-1.08)	.803 (-1.30)
Black immigrant 2008	1.499 (.86)	1.450 (.79)
Black immigrant 2009	1.860 (1.36)	1.763 (1.26)
Hispanic nonimmigrant 2008	1.059 (.29)	1.079 (.36)
Hispanic nonimmigrant 2009	.981 (-.09)	.966 (-.16)
Hispanic immigrant 2008	.804 (-1.10)	.838 (-.88)
Hispanic immigrant 2009	.562* (-2.73)	.579* (2.53)
Other nonimmigrant 2008	.818 (-.67)	.829 (-.61)
Other nonimmigrant 2009	1.436 (-1.30)	1.445 (1.28)
Other immigrant 2008	.911 (-.31)	.894 (-.36)
Other immigrant 2009	1.372 (1.14)	1.371 (1.12)
<i>N</i>	40,559	40,559
McFadden's <i>R</i> ²	.2382	.2596
BIC	25,295	24,702
Years Entry		
Hispanic nonimmigrant 2008	1.059 (.28)	1.078 (.36)
Hispanic nonimmigrant 2009	.981 (-.10)	.966 (-.16)
Hispanic immigrated 20+ years 2008	.659 (-1.45)	.686 (-1.33)
Hispanic immigrated 20+ years 2009	.381* (-2.89)	.383* (-2.85)
Hispanic immigrated 10 to 20 years 2008	.556 (-1.50)	.554 (-1.49)
Hispanic immigrated 10 to 20 years 2009	.734 (-.87)	.734 (-.84)
Hispanic immigrated 5 to 10 years 2008	1.124 (.23)	1.316 (.53)
Hispanic immigrated 5 to 10 years 2009	.650 (-.82)	.724 (-.84)
Hispanic immigrated fewer than five years 2008	1.755 (.91)	1.774 (.88)

(continued)

Table 3. (continued)

	Labor Market Position	Firm Size
Hispanic immigrated fewer than five years 2009	.415 (-.99)	.466 (-.85)
<i>N</i>	40,559	40,559
McFadden's R^2	.2395	.2608
BIC	25,360	24,770
Citizenship		
Hispanic nonimmigrant 2008	1.058 (.28)	1.077 (.36)
Hispanic nonimmigrant 2009	.981 (-.10)	.966 (-.17)
Hispanic immigrant citizen 2008	.811 (-.68)	.849 (-.53)
Hispanic immigrant citizen 2009	.457* (-2.33)	.453* (-2.32)
Hispanic immigrant noncitizen 2008	.735 (-1.14)	.771 (-.96)
Hispanic immigrant noncitizen 2009	.583* (1.98)	.621 (-1.72)
<i>N</i>	40,559	40,559
McFadden's R^2	.2391	.2604
BIC	25,307	24,717
Nationality		
Hispanic nonimmigrant, non-Mexican 2008	.993 (-.02)	1.001 (.00)
Hispanic nonimmigrant, non-Mexican 2009	1.268 (.78)	1.259 (.72)
Hispanic immigrant, non-Mexican 2008	.632 (-1.42)	.635 (-1.40)
Hispanic immigrant, non-Mexican 2009	.461* (-2.33)	.470* (-2.25)
Mexican nonimmigrant 2008	1.104 (.39)	1.130 (.46)
Mexican nonimmigrant 2009	.841 (-.67)	.823 (-.72)
Mexican immigrant 2008	.935 (-.27)	.997 (-.01)
Mexican immigrant 2009	.644 (1.64)	.667 (-1.47)
<i>N</i>	40,559	40,559
McFadden's R^2	.2384	.2599
BIC	25,350	24,756

Note: z-statistics are in parentheses. Data come from the CPS-March outgoing rotation group for appropriate year. Models weighted with the appropriate CPS weights. BICs calculated without weights. All models control for the labor market position and firm size variables defined by RK and immigrant subcategories and year.

* $p < .05$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 4. Interaction Effects Predicting Odds of Unionization between Co-racial/Ethnic Unemployment Rate from the Previous Year and Immigrant Subcategories, 1994 to 2011

	Labor Market		Firm Size	
	1994 to 2007	1994 to 2011	1994 to 2007	1994 to 2011
Immigrant Race				
Unemployment rate	.976 (-.46)	1.063* (1.98)	.978 (-.41)	1.062 (1.91)
White immigrant x unemployment	.947 (-.73)	.982 (-.47)	.928 (-.97)	.980 (-.51)
African American x unemployment	1.070 (1.90)	.967 (-1.87)	1.083* (2.19)	.972 (-1.54)
Black immigrant x unemployment	.996 (-.05)	.961 (-1.12)	.961 (-.57)	.964 (-1.01)
Hispanic nonimmigrant x unemployment	1.028 (.60)	.977 (-1.10)	1.021 (.44)	.977 (-1.04)
Hispanic immigrant x unemployment	1.009 (.20)	.942* (-2.73)	1.014 (.29)	.942* (-2.65)
Other nonimmigrant x unemployment	.991 (-.16)	.983 (-.51)	1.002 (.03)	.981 (-.56)
Other immigrant x unemployment	1.066 (1.16)	.984 (-.50)	1.053 (.93)	.982 (-.55)
<i>N</i>	203,585	256,480	200,294	252,104
McFadden's R^2	.2309	.2330	.2518	.2534
BIC	130,762	162,096	126,102	156,321
Years Entry				
Unemployment rate	.985 (-.27)	1.075* (2.36)	.987 (-.25)	1.072* (2.22)
Hispanic nonimmigrant x unemployment	1.021 (.45)	.972 (-1.35)	1.014 (.30)	.973 (-1.25)
Hispanic immigrated 20+ years x unemployment	.961 (-.69)	.910* (-3.33)	.958 (-.72)	.909* (-3.31)
Hispanic immigrated 10 to 20 years x unemployment	1.093 (1.42)	.973 (-.82)	1.088 (1.29)	.970 (-.89)
Hispanic immigrated 5 to 10 years x unemployment	1.008 (.10)	.963 (-.76)	1.036 (.44)	.961 (-.78)
Hispanic immigrated fewer than five years x unemployment	.954 (-.55)	.858* (-2.47)	.976 (-.27)	.888 (-1.88)
<i>N</i>	203,585	256,480	200,294	252,104
McFadden's R^2	.2316	.2337	.2524	.2539
BIC	130,752	162,081	126,102	156,316
Citizenship				
Unemployment	.981 (-.36)	1.078* (2.44)	.981 (-.34)	1.075* (2.29)
Hispanic nonimmigrant x unemployment	1.025 (.53)	.971 (-1.39)	1.018 (.38)	.972 (-1.29)
Hispanic immigrant citizen x unemployment	1.033 (.53)	.962 (-1.35)	1.026 (.42)	.956 (-1.55)
Hispanic immigrant noncitizen x unemployment	1.012 (.24)	.909* (-3.45)	1.021 (.39)	.914* (-3.17)
<i>N</i>	203,585	256,480	200,294	252,104
McFadden's R^2	.2314	.2337	.2524	.2539
BIC	130,730	162,025	126,085	156,275

(continued)

Table 4. (continued)

	Labor Market		Firm Size	
	1994 to 2007	1994 to 2011	1994 to 2007	1994 to 2011
Nationality				
Unemployment rate	.977 (-.43)	1.062* (1.97)	.980 (-.38)	1.061 (1.90)
Hispanic nonimmigrant non-Mexican x unemployment	.985 (-.27)	.957 (-1.52)	.970 (-.54)	.950 (-1.72)
Hispanic immigrant, non-Mexican x unemployment	1.048 (.85)	.938* (-2.15)	1.036 (.62)	.936* (-2.17)
Mexican nonimmigrant x unemployment	1.053 (1.01)	.989 (-.44)	1.051 (.93)	.994 (-.22)
Mexican immigrant x unemployment	.981 (-.36)	.944* (-2.18)	.997 (-.06)	.946* (-2.06)
<i>N</i>	203,585	256,480	200,294	252,104
McFadden's <i>R</i> ²	.2310	.2331	.2519	.2534
BIC	130,800	162,140	126,140	156,363

Note: z-statistics are in parentheses. Data come from the CPS-March outgoing rotation group for appropriate year. The unemployment rate is calculated for four race/ethnic categories (white, black, Hispanic, other) for respondents age 18 to 65 years using the MORG to give the annualized unemployment rate. The independent variable is lagged one year from the unemployment rate to help prevent reverse causation because unions emphasize economic gains that may result in a disemployment effect. All models include variables from Table 1. The reference category for all models is nonimmigrant whites. Models weighted with the appropriate CPS weights. BICs calculated without weights.

**p* < .05 (two-tailed tests).

unemployment during the recession and the odds of leaving a union in a one-year period. First, as noted earlier, the recession may have affected unionized sectors more than non-unionized sectors. Immigrants tend to concentrate in the construction industry and low-wage occupations—industries that were especially hard-hit during the recession. If these industries became less union dense as the recession unfolded, this would have a major impact on the likelihood that an immigrant would hold on to a union job. A model determining the shift from employment to unemployment shows that, controlling for industry and other labor market position variables, the odds of entry into unemployment in a one-year period were significantly lower for union members than for nonunionized workers as the recession unfolded.¹⁰ Unionized workers were thus less rather than more likely to lose their jobs.

Second, by focusing on union leavers, as opposed to union joiners, we can better understand why effects described earlier may have occurred and simultaneously shed light on whether the changing industrial composition of the U.S. workforce may be to blame for the decline in unionization of Hispanic immigrants (and Hispanic immigrant subcategories).¹¹ Table 4 presents odds of leaving a union (as opposed to staying in a union) for race/ethnic categories and Hispanic immigrant subcategories. The model showing race/ethnic immigrant and nonimmigrant categories also reports selected industries to show whether working in these industries significantly predicts union leaving.

The first three columns of Table 5 control for the labor market position variables defined by RK. The next three columns add a dummy variable for change in occupation and a dummy variable for the change in industry to

the market position variables. The last three columns limit the sample to only respondents who remained in a stable occupation and industry. Odds that both immigrants and non-immigrant minorities leave a union (as opposed to staying in a union) increase compared to native non-Hispanic whites between the pre-recession and recession/post-recession years.¹² These trends continue when change in occupation and industry dummies are included. The CPS does not allow analysis for individuals who remained employed with the same employer. However, respondents who stayed in the same occupation and industry (with the exception of the other race categories) also showed increased odds of leaving a union compared to their white counterparts. The gap between minority immigrant groups and native non-Hispanic whites widened in the intermediary period, with few exceptions. In all likelihood, this was a result of minorities' vulnerability to economic downturns. Hout and colleagues (2011) suggest the recession affected minorities before the recession officially began in December 2007—especially for African Americans and immigrants—a finding consistent with the odds of losing a union job in my own analysis. For instance, Hispanic-origin natives were no more likely to lose a union job than were non-Hispanic whites in 2004 to 2006, but they had 55.4 percent higher odds of leaving a union than did non-Hispanic whites in the intermediary period. In the recession/post-recession years, the gap was invariably significant and tended to widen. In a few cases it tightened a bit—perhaps because minorities had already lost their union status—but it never fails to achieve significance.

Logistic regressions from Table 2 suggest that Hispanic immigrants were most likely to lose union status. Hispanic immigrants were more likely to leave a union than were native non-Hispanic whites in all models in all periods. In fact, in the labor market position model, Hispanic immigrants had 79.9 percent higher odds of leaving a union (as opposed to staying in a union) between 2004 and 2006 and 94.2 percent higher odds of leaving a

union between 2008 and 2010 than did their native non-Hispanic white counterparts.

Table 5 controls for selected industries to determine whether elevated odds of leaving a union were due to the changing composition of U.S. industries. There were no significant differences in leaving a union (as opposed to staying in a union) between the shown industries and the baseline agriculture, forestry, and fishery industry in the three periods. The sign changed, however, in all but the stable occupation and industry models from lower (but not significant) odds of leaving to higher (but not significant) odds of leaving between the three periods. This suggests that holding a job in these industries did not significantly predict whether someone lost a union job, and the changing composition alone did not account for Hispanic immigrants' lower odds of holding a union job.

Table 5 also reports the odds of leaving a union in a one-year period for Hispanic immigrant subcategories. Whereas seniority schemes may predict that recent Hispanic immigrants will become increasingly more likely to leave a union because unions have only recently targeted these groups, it is possible that immigrants who have remained in the United States for a long period should be no less likely to leave a union than would a native non-Hispanic white. Unfortunately, the CPS does not report how long an individual has remained on the job, so this analysis is impossible. But the odds that Hispanic immigrants left a union increased as the recession unfolded, regardless of how many years they had remained in the United States compared with their native non-Hispanic white counterparts. Logistic regressions show that Hispanic immigrants who had remained in the United States for more than 20 years were more likely to hold a union job in 2007 and neither less nor more likely to hold a union job in a statistical sense than were native whites in 2009. However, the gap between this group and native non-Hispanic whites in the odds of leaving a union increased from 52.3 percent higher odds in 2004 to 2006 to 71.9 percent higher odds in 2008 to 2010.

Table 5. Odds Ratios for Multinomial Regressions for Leaving a Union (as Opposed to Staying in a Union) in a One-Year Period

	Labor Market Position						Includes Change in Occupation and Industry						Limited to Stable Occupation and Industry						
	2004 to 2006		2006 to 2008		2008 to 2010		2004 to 2006		2006 to 2008		2008 to 2010		2004 to 2006		2006 to 2008		2008 to 2010		
White immigrant	1.694*	1.630*	2.270*	1.684*	1.638*	2.207*	1.537*	1.769*	2.325*										
	(4.07)	(3.43)	(6.17)	(3.99)	(3.43)	(5.95)	(2.69)	(3.47)	(5.38)										
African American	1.218*	1.485*	1.470*	1.172*	1.411*	1.427*	1.138	1.383*	1.472*										
	(2.58)	(5.22)	(4.92)	(2.06)	(4.50)	(4.52)	(1.40)	(3.50)	(4.24)										
Black immigrant	1.954*	1.300	1.902*	1.869*	1.215	1.821*	1.726*	1.612*	1.773*										
	(3.66)	(1.56)	(3.70)	(3.40)	(1.13)	(3.47)	(2.35)	(2.37)	(2.84)										
Hispanic nonimmigrant	1.290*	1.514*	1.350*	1.280*	1.475*	1.331*	1.200	1.530*	1.305*										
	(2.71)	(4.63)	(3.30)	(2.61)	(4.31)	(3.13)	(1.59)	(3.94)	(2.44)										
Hispanic immigrant	1.799*	1.725*	1.942*	1.798*	1.695*	1.923*	1.774*	1.774*	2.127*										
	(5.27)	(4.98)	(6.11)	(5.25)	(4.79)	(5.99)	(4.23)	(4.25)	(5.84)										
Other nonimmigrant	1.249*	1.331*	1.008	1.207	1.282*	.990	1.166	1.376*	.958										
	(3.66)	(4.42)	(.06)	(1.49)	(1.98)	(-.08)	(.99)	(2.06)	(-.27)										
Other immigrant	1.249	1.752*	1.828*	1.974*	1.715*	1.827*	2.192*	1.708*	2.001*										
	(1.76)	(4.42)	(5.22)	(5.41)	(4.23)	(5.18)	(5.31)	(3.54)	(5.14)										
Selected Industries																			
Construction	.566	.576	1.182	.624	.615	1.264	.415	.437	.483										
	(-1.51)	(-1.35)	(.43)	(-1.22)	(-1.18)	(.59)	(-1.68)	(-1.47)	(-1.47)										
Manufacturing durables	.630	.555	1.257	.681	.593	1.365	.404	.415	.583										
	(-1.23)	(-1.44)	(.59)	(-1.00)	(-1.27)	(.79)	(-1.74)	(-1.56)	(-1.09)										
Manufacturing nondurables	.659	.603	1.358	.677	.604	1.436	.448	.501	.584										
	(-1.10)	(-1.22)	(.78)	(-1.01)	(-1.21)	(.91)	(-1.53)	(-1.22)	(-1.08)										
Transportation	.541	.537	1.197	.612	.592	1.368	.383	.439	.615										
	(-1.64)	(-1.52)	(.47)	(-1.28)	(-1.28)	(.80)	(-1.86)	(-1.46)	(-1.00)										
Public administration	.763	.679	1.760	.811	.707	1.856	.576	.545	.882										
	(-72)	(-95)	(1.46)	(-.55)	(-.85)	(1.58)	(-1.07)	(-1.08)	(-.26)										
N	101,776	102,621	100,573	101,776	102,621	101,573	68,921	68,692	69,984										
McFadden's R ²	.1672	.1660	.1789	.1751	.1738	.1849	.1869	.1880	.1971										
BIC	115,091	114,510	110,432	114,116	113,524	109,690	81,320	80,134	79,579										

(continued)

Table 5. (continued)

	Labor Market Position			Includes Change in Occupation and Industry			Limited to Stable Occupation and Industry		
	2004 to 2006	2006 to 2008	2008 to 2010	2004 to 2006	2006 to 2008	2008 to 2010	2004 to 2006	2006 to 2008	2008 to 2010
Year Entry									
Hispanic nonimmigrant	1.274* (2.58)	1.501* (4.54)	1.347* (3.58)	1.265* (2.49)	1.462* (4.21)	1.328* (3.11)	1.183 (1.46)	1.515* (3.84)	1.306* (2.40)
Hispanic immigrated 20+ years	1.523* (2.85)	1.362* (2.11)	1.719* (4.03)	1.515* (2.80)	1.349* (2.01)	1.707* (3.95)	1.559* (2.52)	1.447* (1.99)	1.768* (3.50)
Hispanic immigrated 10 to 20 years	1.451 (1.90)	2.018* (3.41)	2.113* (3.62)	1.448 (1.89)	1.970* (3.29)	2.118* (3.59)	1.169 (.60)	2.163* (3.11)	3.065* (4.66)
Hispanic immigrated 5 to 10 years	2.235* (2.48)	2.413* (3.59)	2.991* (3.54)	2.323* (2.58)	2.373* (3.52)	2.770* (3.36)	2.882* (2.83)	1.794 (1.93)	2.096 (1.90)
Hispanic immigrated fewer than five years	4.023* (4.04)	1.991 (1.92)	4.676* (3.52)	4.029* (4.09)	1.841 (1.70)	4.742* (3.57)	2.869* (2.65)	2.013 (1.66)	4.159* (2.74)
N	101,776	102,621	100,573	101,776	102,621	100,573	68,921	68,692	69,984
McFadden's R^2	.1678	.1665	.1797	.1757	.1742	.1857	.1875	.1882	.1979
BIC	115,141	114,563	110,455	114,166	113,578	109,714	81,380	80,213	79,646
Citizenship									
Hispanic nonimmigrant	1.292* (2.72)	1.516* (4.65)	1.351* (3.31)	1.282* (2.64)	1.478* (4.33)	1.333* (3.15)	1.204 (1.62)	1.533* (3.95)	1.306* (2.44)
Hispanic immigrated citizen	1.501* (2.84)	1.312 (1.89)	1.639* (3.72)	1.447* (2.59)	1.277 (1.69)	1.605* (3.52)	1.345 (1.68)	1.351 (1.69)	1.827* (3.79)
Hispanic immigrant noncitizen	2.277* (5.36)	2.481* (6.06)	2.656* (6.03)	2.340* (5.49)	2.452* (5.94)	2.645* (6.00)	2.448* (4.80)	2.493* (4.94)	2.803* (5.39)
N	101,776	102,621	100,573	101,776	102,621	100,573	68,921	68,692	69,984
McFadden's R^2	.1677	.1667	.1795	.1756	.1745	.1855	.1874	.1886	.1978
BIC	115,085	114,488	110,395	114,108	113,501	109,652	81,323	80,130	79,580

Note: z-statistics are in parentheses. Data come from the Matched-CPS MORG for appropriate years. All models include variables from Table 1 except firm size. The models also include four region dummies (as opposed to state fixed effects) and control for year (with the earliest year as the reference). The reference category for all models is nonimmigrant whites. Models weighted with the appropriate CPS weights. The BIC is calculated without weights.
 * $p < .05$ (two-tailed tests).

We see the same results for Hispanic immigrants who became U.S. citizens. Hispanic immigrant citizens and noncitizens show increasing odds of leaving a union compared to native non-Hispanic whites following the patterns above. These effects continue to manifest in models that include a change in occupation and industry as well as the model limiting the sample to respondents who remained in the same occupation and industry. With the exception of Mexican-origin natives, the nationality models also show similar results. The race/ethnic immigrant and nonimmigrant models show increasing odds of leaving a union for Hispanic-origin natives compared to their native white counterparts as described earlier. Table 5 provides insight that the recession engendered mechanisms that might offset those of RK's joining models, whatever those mechanisms may be. These results present a different trend than previous research that portrays immigrants as a source of union revival (e.g., Milkman 2006) or shows higher odds of immigrant union affiliation prior to the Great Recession (RK 2009).

CONCLUSIONS

Recessions are an unavoidable feature of market economies, and they will affect the life chances and opportunity structures available to different groups depending on how they are mediated by societal institutions and economic structures. My results suggest that, net of other factors, compared to non-Hispanic whites, Hispanic immigrants were more likely to lose union jobs (whether voluntarily or involuntarily) at an increased rate during the Great Recession. This has potentially disruptive effects throughout the economy and society. After all, immigrants have breathed new life into unions, and unions have given working-class immigrants a

potential ladder out of low-paying jobs. But unions that hope to organize immigrants must address cultural and language differences as well as possible racial prejudices from employers and the native working class. Recessions may make this task harder by altering the design of governmental policies, employers' attitudes, and the patience of local communities—and in so doing may steer immigrants away from the organizable sectors of the economy to ethnic and enclave economies that may be unorganizable. If the link between unions and immigrants is severed, both communities are likely to suffer.

The specific mechanisms that would lead to lower immigrant unionization in bad times should thus be examined—perhaps through case studies that ask not only “who joins” but also “who leaves unions.” Such analyses would shed light not only on why immigrants were disproportionately likely to lose union jobs in the recession, but also on whether their rates of unionization will recover with the macroeconomy—or whether a lasting scarring effect will make immigrants more difficult to organize in the future.

RK conclude that many Hispanic immigrant subgroups have a higher propensity to unionize than do native-born workers and find evidence for the “steady” assimilation of Hispanics who find themselves in “organizable labor market positions” (p. 933). But immigrants' propensity to unionize is by no means unchanging, and Hispanic assimilation need not be steady over time. RK identified very real gains among immigrants in the period prior to the Great Recession, but my analysis suggests these gains have to a large degree evaporated in the wake of the recent downturn. To fully understand the immigrant–union relationship, and to avoid the perils of ahistoricism, we need to examine data collected in bad times as well as good times at a relatively fine level of detail.

APPENDIX

Table A1. Odds Ratios Predicting Employed Worker Transitions to Unemployment in a One-Year Period

	2004 to 2006	2006 to 2008	2008 to 2010
Union	.995 (-.06)	.804* (-2.56)	.882* (-2.12)
Race (White ref.)			
Black	1.622* (5.93)	1.600* (6.25)	1.737* (9.71)
Hispanic	1.083 (.97)	.908 (-1.27)	1.063 (1.10)
Other race	1.199 (1.70)	1.056 (.54)	1.108 (1.38)
Male	.941 (-1.02)	1.059 (1.04)	1.078 (1.81)
Married	.625* (-8.63)	.594* (-10.35)	.650* (-11.47)
Age (exper.)	.989 (-1.25)	.965* (-4.35)	.982* (-2.93)
Age sq. (exper. squared)	1.000 (.45)	1.000* (3.41)	1.000* (2.37)
Education (<HS ref.)			
High school	.876 (-1.57)	.744* (-3.92)	.800* (-3.74)
Some college	.671* (-4.35)	.607* (-6.20)	.736* (-4.79)
BA +	.616* (-4.51)	.505* (-6.98)	.580* (-7.19)
Private Sector	1.578* (3.81)	1.416* (3.34)	1.809* (7.21)
Occupation (professional/managerial reference)			
Farm/forestry/fishery	1.658 (1.94)	1.421 (1.24)	.882 (-.57)
Production/craft/repair	1.469* (4.14)	1.350* (3.60)	1.338* (4.95)
Service occupations	1.311* (3.45)	1.247* (3.09)	1.149* (2.63)
Industry (Ag. ref.)			
Mining	.098* (-3.32)	.877 (-.36)	1.014 (.06)
Construction	.923 (-.36)	1.610* (2.10)	1.379* (2.03)
Manu. durables	.707 (-1.58)	1.116 (.48)	.958 (-.27)
Manu. nondurables	.663 (-1.79)	.964 (-.15)	.653* (-2.54)
Transportation	.385* (-3.75)	.908 (-.39)	.603* (-2.96)
Communications	.864 (-.56)	.955 (-.17)	.785 (-1.26)
Utilities	.391* (-2.74)	.532 (-1.82)	.391* (-3.97)

(continued)

Table A1. (continued)

	2004 to 2006	2006 to 2008	2008 to 2010
Wholesale trade	.619 (-1.90)	.813 (-.82)	.620* (-2.68)
Retail trade	.895 (-.53)	1.040 (.18)	.627* (-3.04)
F.I.R.E.	.569* (-2.43)	1.037 (.15)	.565* (-3.43)
Business repair	.939 (-.28)	1.184 (.73)	.873 (-.83)
Personal services	.751 (-1.23)	1.003 (.01)	.612* (-2.82)
Rec./entertain.	1.019 (.07)	1.025 (.09)	.603* (-2.62)
Professional services	.532* (-2.93)	.728 (-1.42)	.477* (-4.73)
Public admin.	.510* (-2.39)	.434* (-2.84)	.287* (-5.70)
Unclassified	.494 (-1.65)	1.078 (.20)	.530* (-1.99)
Region/metro/year	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	105,533	106,022	105,174

Note: z-statistics are in parentheses. Data come from the CPS-MORG Matching for appropriate years. Models weighted with the appropriate CPS weights. F.I.R.E. refers to financial, insurance, and real estate industries.

* $p < .05$ (two-tailed tests).

Acknowledgments

I gratefully thank Jake Rosenfeld and Meredith Kleykamp who blindly sent their MORG recode and Matching do files. I would also like to acknowledge Andrew Schrank, Melissa Binder, John Roberts, Dale Willits, Jessica Garrick, and the anonymous *ASR* reviewers for their insightful comments and helpful suggestions and assistance.

Notes

1. The United States has experienced only two recessions since the CPS began to identify immigrants in 1994. This comment is focused on the Great Recession of 2008, but I also found some evidence of a delayed recession effect from the 2001 dot-com crash in 2002, when Hispanic and Hispanic-immigrant unemployment increased (Hout, Levanon, and Cumberworth 2011) (results available upon request). Furthermore, RK’s Figure 2 shows potential recession effects for Hispanics in most recession periods (the interesting exception being the 1981 to 1982 recession, which until recently was the most severe postwar recession).
2. All CPS datasets were downloaded from the National Bureau of Economic Research (<http://www.nber.org/cps>). My own files used to recode

and merge the NBER data are available upon request in addition to all supplementary analyses.

3. By keeping the positive selection of only respondents who remain employed, I implicitly controlled for those who were more likely to lose a job during the recession.
4. The logistic regressions control for the labor market and firm size variables defined by RK (for a list of covariates used, see Rosenfeld and Kleykamp [2009] Table A2, p. 935). The multinomial logistic regressions control for the labor market position variables, regional dummies (as opposed to state fixed effects following RK), and year.
5. I also compared 2006 with 2008, but these results show similar but less severe declines.
6. The notable differences, namely marital status showing nonsignificance, may be because RK had a larger sample spread over several years.
7. The recession effects occur for Hispanic immigrants.
8. Milkman (2006) argues that kinship among immigrants in the workplace and community is the foundation for building solidarity among workers. This, along with previous organizing experience and a shared experience of stigmatization, is why immigrants have a higher propensity to organize. However, if there is a high co-ethnic unemployment rate, workers may fear exercising co-ethnic solidarity if there is a strong chance of losing their jobs.

9. Unemployment increased slightly in the years after the 2001 dot-com crash. See note 1 for the analysis looking at this period.
10. See Table A1 in the Appendix for results.
11. I do not report the odds of joining a union because the economic downturn reduced the number of people who report this status. However, the odds of joining a union (as opposed to never being in a union) increased or remained similar over the three periods for many of the race/ethnicity categories compared to native whites. Whereas these groups' preference for union jobs may have increased, union joiners are not able to replace union leavers during the recession.
12. The exception being the nonimmigrant other race category, which largely consists of Asian Americans.

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